

1 **Grounding social foundations for Integrated Assessment Models** 2 **of climate change**

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28 **Key Points:**

- 29 • Policy-makers need models with social assessment for developing effective climate
30 policies.
- 31 • Structures of currently existing IAMs are mostly oriented at understanding interactions
32 between economics and biophysical systems.
- 33 • Integrating social processes in IAMs may be done through the social branches of
34 economics.
35

36 Abstract

37 Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) are commonly used by decision-makers in order to derive
38 climate policies. IAMs are currently based on climate-economics interactions whereas the role of
39 social system has been highlighted to be of prime importance on the implementation of climate
40 policies. Beyond existing IAMs, we argue that it is therefore urgent to increase efforts in the
41 integration of social processes within IAMs. For achieving such a challenge, we present some
42 promising avenues of research based on the social branches of economics. We finally present the
43 potential implications yielded by such social IAMs.

44

45 1 Introduction

46 The progress in reaching climate policy goals so far has been much slower than needed to avoid
47 catastrophic consequences. Achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement on climate change requires
48 a fundamental transition of the economy and society that is comparable in scale to the industrial
49 revolution or the Neolithic revolution. Such fundamental transitions are “*the result of a co-*
50 *evolution of economic, cultural, technological, ecological and institutional developments at*
51 *different scale-levels*” (Loorbach & Rotmans, 2010). To design feasible and viable transition
52 pathways, we need decision-support tools that incorporate the complexity and interdisciplinarity
53 associated with such a multi-dimensional transition. Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) are
54 famous for being decision-making support tools for designing climate policy solutions and have
55 been used for informing climate policy for several decades. However, the structures of currently
56 existing IAMs are mostly oriented at understanding interactions between economics and
57 biophysical systems, while the principles of the social system functioning and the behavior of
58 actors involved are addressed in the models only to a limited extent. Being convinced that IAMs
59 will and should remain key tools for informing decision-making in the climate policy domain, we
60 argue that IAMs need to be transformed on the level of the models’ structure in order to help
61 reaching the Paris Agreement goals as soon as possible.

62

63 IAM development has generally moved from a narrow, disciplinary orientation to more complex
64 and integrated structures. While the earlier generation of IAMs aimed at answering quite specific
65 research questions (e.g. DICE (Nordhaus, 1993)), the new generation of IAMs (see e.g. latest
66 versions of IMAGE (Alcamo, 1994)) focuses on a much wider range of research questions and on
67 multidisciplinary and integrated approaches. However, despite a higher level of integration of
68 different domains in the IAMs’ structures, social complexity is rarely portrayed there beyond
69 purely economic behavior. Indeed, in terms of social dynamics, existing IAMs typically consider
70 the whole world (or a small number of world regions for the RICE model) as just one or a small
71 number of rational and farsighted agents with “rational expectations” (i.e. correct beliefs about the
72 future) who make decisions that optimize social welfare (measured in economic terms) over the
73 analysed time period. The goal of this approach is the identification of cost optimal pathways for
74 climate change mitigation from a technological and economic point of view. Questions of
75 implementation of the identified pathways in a complex social world and mitigation of social
76 impacts are left to subsequent considerations. We argue that the identification of optimal pathways
77 has some merit by providing a benchmark for action, but that those IAMs provide limited guidance
78 for the design of effective climate mitigation policies. **Indeed, existing IAMs are mainly used for
79 optimizing climate policy by maximizing the discounted sum of utilities over decades despite of**

80 all parameter uncertainties (Ackerman *et al.*, 2009). Non-optimal approaches have
81 counterbalanced these optimization-based drawbacks, based on sustainability boundaries (Heitzig
82 *et al.*, 2016) or based on the concept of “safe operating space” applied on climate change (Mathias
83 *et al.*, 2017). But existing IAMs are still designed to be blind to social drivers, impacts and
84 complexity that makes existing IAMs inadequate for designing climate policies for coping with
85 global change as highlighted by Morgan *et al.* (1999). Besides, the earth system has closely
86 tracked the baseline scenario for the past 20 years (Alcamo *et al.*, 1996) suggesting that policy-
87 makers needs integrated tools that encompass all the socio-political complexity. But the next
88 generation of integrated models of World-Earth dynamics that we are calling for should be able to
89 produce trajectories that can in principle be helpful for policy-makers. This requires integrating
90 the social system in IAMs’ structures.

91

92 When it comes to better understanding what the role of the “social” is in this context, we argue
93 that it is important to distinguish between social dynamics that *drive* climate change from those
94 that are *impacted* by climate change. Finally, it is essential to understand whether and how actions
95 of different parties are mutually dependent, and how they unfold synergies or counteract each other
96 because of social complexity. On the impact side of social dynamics, the concept of social cost of
97 carbon (Pindyck, 2019) currently dominates climate policy discourse, addressing such issues as
98 climate change effect on agricultural productivity, human health, or property damages for instance
99 (Mearns & Norton, 2010). Therefore, for better accounting of social cost, it has become
100 increasingly important to address in IAMs such social system aspects as equality, welfare
101 distribution, ethical or justice issues (Ackerman *et al.*, 2009). Increased accuracy of climate
102 damages accounting will be beneficial for understanding both the underestimated and the
103 overestimated share of social costs (Ackerman *et al.*, 2009).

104 **2 Building climate transition pathways on social foundations**

105 IPCC – as well as a large part of the scientific community – favors transition pathways that include
106 social aspects such as motivational factors, institutional feasibility or behavioral changes.
107 However, we have to move forward from these intentions to operational tools for policy-makers.
108 For developing such operational tools, we suggest a “paradigm shift” in IAM development. In
109 particular, the above outlined social drivers are neglected in IAMs and their use, so far. However,
110 they are crucial for understanding actual dynamics of climate change mitigation action. Moreover,
111 including them in models becomes all the more important as soon as social impacts of climate
112 change begin to affect social drivers – leading to a feedback loop that may drive non-linear
113 dynamics which traditional IAMs are not able to capture. As a starting point, we argue that IAMs
114 should progressively include the results that connect economics with social sciences as IAMs
115 currently connect economics with climate. More specifically, IAMs are mainly founded in
116 neoclassical economics while several other branches of economics consider social aspects. Among
117 them, we point out three branches of economics from which social processes may be considered
118 and formalized for tackling climate issues: behavioral economics, welfare economics and political
119 economics.

120

121 First, behavioral economics may overcome the limitation of rational choice theory by formalizing
122 psychological processes involved in climate-economics interactions. Indeed, while most IAMs
123 focus on economic decisions by a hypothetical rational social planner, actual technological and
124 behavioral change comes from many boundedly rational players at different societal levels,


125 interacting not only via price signals but also through non-economic processes such as social
126 norms, spreading information or preferences with non-monetary components. For instance, a
127 recent study in North Carolina (USA) shows the impact of intergenerational learning on the
128 perception of climate change (Lawson *et al.*, 2019). This study shows how education of children
129 may affect the behavior of parents without any economic incentives. **This intergenerational**
130 **learning also highlights the unexpected effects of population inversion - the global population will**
131 **become older in following decades. Therefore, beyond the quantitative effect of population**
132 **inversion on the economy, it is also important to study the qualitative effect of a change in the**
133 **population structure through the lens of behavioral economics.** The emerging fields of social
134 simulation and complexity economics suggest that such behavioral effects can cause much more
135 nonlinear trajectories than represented in close-to-equilibrium economic models, containing
136 tipping behavior highly relevant for the transitions that IAMs are meant to study (Farmer *et al.*,
137 2019).

138
139 Second, formalizing components of welfare economics in IAMs may evaluate inequity and
140 distributional impacts that affect the feasibility of climate policies (Hirth & Ueckerdt, 2013) as
141 shown, for instance, by the “yellow jacket” crisis in France. The fuel tax implemented by the
142 French government created distributional effects (especially between rural and urban populations)
143 yielding weekly protestations whereas the same people support actions against climate change.
144 Existing IAMs analyze measures based on their consequences on the whole economy (GDP) and
145 on CO₂ emissions. However, such measures also have distributional effects within the economy
146 (i.e. *who “wins” and who “loses”*) that may affect population’s welfare. A truly “integrated
147 assessment” of climate protection measures should include an assessment of such distributional
148 side-effects, because those side-effects are the most important in the feasibility of measures. The
149 current approach of IAMs to inequality is to disregard it or at best include it in some inequality-
150 averse welfare measure that is then used as the optimization target. This ignores however the
151 feedback effects of inequality on economic pathways and on the feasibility of policy measures.
152 Welfare economics can therefore provide operational tools (Fankhauser *et al.*, 1997) in order not
153 to reinforce potential inequalities that may emerge from climate policies. Since agents’ perceptions
154 of what a just climate policy regime is not only depend on issues such as inequality but also
155 strongly on various notions of historical responsibility, the design of welfare measures for use in
156 IAMs should also make use of tools from the emerging field of formal ethics (Chockler & Halpern,
157 2004).

158
159 Third, political economics would highlight resistance or support dynamics on climate policies
160 emerging from the effects of political power and lobbying. These political processes are neglected
161 in IAMs whereas measures have to be decided within a socio-political context that renders some
162 measures unfeasible while others may receive more support from influential actor groups. Political
163 leaders typically seek compromise with important stakeholder groups beforehand. For instance, in
164 the case of the Waxman-Markey bill in USA which would have set a limit on the emission of
165 greenhouse gases, the role of political lobbying over climate policy has been estimated to US\$60
166 billion in terms of social costs (Meng & Rode, 2019). In this latter case, the effect of lobbying has
167 been neglected whereas it significantly downsizes the expected results. Such socio-political factors
168 contributing to the lack of climate ambition are not taken into account in IAMs so far despite of
169 their well-established impacts (Meng & Rode, 2019). **Even if it doesn’t encompass all the**
170 **complexity of power and politics, integrating politico-economic processes (e.g. lobbying) in IAMs**

171 may give new insights in terms of climate trajectories in order to take into account, for instance,
 172 the strong resistance to a sustainable future (« negative resilience ») from those benefiting from
 173 the current situation (for instance oil companies) and how they may influence the policy-making
 174 process.

175
 176 Integrating these three main social strands in IAMs requires not only the inclusion of state-of-the-
 177 art and cutting-edge model components but also the acquisition of social data for driving and
 178 validating the models. Either such data are readily available (e.g. input-output tables, data from
 179 social networks) or data have to be elicited and assessed. Eliciting and assessing new social data
 180 may be done through a variety of participatory modelling approaches to collect perceptions of
 181 large participant groups, focusing on social climate change issues connecting to geographical
 182 locations. Such massive data may be collected through qualitative surveys and expertise using
 183 participatory face-to-face or online approaches. Once data are collected, analysis becomes
 184 challenging due to its volume and heterogeneity. Artificial intelligence – based on data mining –
 185 is a natural way for addressing the issue of quantity and heterogeneity of data for extracting social
 186 patterns. Methods for social media mining (Zafarani *et al.*, 2014) such as sentiment analysis,
 187 relational data mining and predictive modeling can represent powerful tools for discovering social
 188 patterns in data, which enriches the existing process- or cost-based IAMs with an additional social
 189 component (Figure 1).



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191

192 **Figure 1.** The role of complex social system on climate dynamics. IAMs should progressively
 193 include complex social dynamics through social branches of economics (e.g. behavioral, welfare
 194 or political economics) that are natural connections between social and economics processes
 195 already used in IAMs.

196

197 **3 Implementing the global response through the lens of social change**

198 At a glance, developing effective climate policy means to introduce a coherent methodological
 199 perspective by extending IAMs' structure towards economics that takes into account social
 200 aspects, such as behavioral, welfare or political economics. These branches of economics will
 201 foster the integration of social processes in the existing modeling of economics-climate
 202 interactions. Besides, the social branches of economics also require fundamental efforts in the
 203 different fields of social sciences as sociology, psychology, political sciences, cultural multi-scalar
 204 structure and so on. However, we argue that considering these domains as a bridge between social
 205 foundations and IAMs is required for moving from intentions to actions **in order to trigger public**
 206 **support for stringent mitigation and what would lead to a profound transformation in climate**
 207 **policies (Dowlatabadi, 2000)**. Once these social foundations are built up in IAMs, they will open
 208 up new perspectives for climate actors in terms of mitigation pathways. More specifically, one
 209 key-outcome of considering social aspects in IAMs – and therefore in climate policies – may be a
 210 greater attention to social dynamics for coping with climate change. This transformation may be
 211 driven by different social approaches based on social norms (Nyborg *et al.*, 2016), nudge theory
 212 or social innovations (Moulaert *et al.*, 2013). For instance, social innovations refer to new ways of
 213 meeting social needs or delivering social benefits to communities. Their implementation is sought
 214 to improve human rights, tackle poverty and social exclusion (Moulaert *et al.*, 2013). The
 215 integration of social processes in IAMs can lead to complementary bottom-up approaches, where
 216 the impact of households on climate through, for example, mobility and consumption choices, can
 217 be understood and acted upon via social change interventions. This fills the gap between how
 218 household perceive their role in climate change mitigation and the input received from climate
 219 policies. IAMs with embedded social processes may provide crucial information to address this
 220 mismatch. Such approaches may build environmental-friendly solutions based on a better
 221 understanding of interactions between social, economic and climate dynamics. Ultimately, this
 222 may lead to better consumption attitudes such as extensive consumption, less waste, and more
 223 cooperation through exchange of goods for reuse or services. In the long-term, integrating social
 224 foundations in IAMs will foster such social change towards a low carbon and just society.

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