14 Dic New, highlighted paper on identity and coordination
Along with Mattia Mazzoli, we have studied the problem of coordination on complex networks when there are two types of agents and they prefer different options to coordinate. We predict that mixed equilibria, in which a sizable fraction of players play the action they prefer arise only when the composition of the network is close to 50-50. When the problem is of anti-coordination instead, sometimes even a large majority ends up anti-coordinating with their neighbors because they do not realize they are in a majority. All these results, and more contained in the paper, make it clear that the interplay of identity and complex connectivity on strategic behavior is very non trivial. The paper, entitled “Equilibria, information and frustration in heterogeneous network games with conflicting preferences“, has been selected as a highlight by the Journal on which it appear, JSTAT, and it will be available for free for the next six months.